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The Public Sector Compensatory Time Exception
to the Fair Labor Standards Act: Trying to
Compensate for Congress's Lack of Clarity
In 1985, the Supreme Court decided the landmark case
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority' and ef-
fectively removed the tenth amendment as a substantive bar-
rier to congressional action vis-fi-vis the states.2 Garcia also
required states to comply with the minimum wage and over-
time provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA or
Act).3 In response to the significant additional costs of applying
the FLSA to the states, Congress amended the FLSA in 1985 to
allow states and their political subdivisions to grant compensa-
tory time4 in lieu of overtime.5
After the 1985 amendments, the FLSA requires that state
and local governments grant compensatory time only pursuant
to agreements with their employees.6 Such agreements must
be between either the public sector employer and the employ-
ees' representative,7 or between the public sector employer and
individual employees.8 The statute, however, does not clearly
define when a state or political subdivision must enter into a
compensatory time agreement with its employees' representa-
tive.9 The legislative history and administrative regulations
1. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
2. See infra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
4. Department of Labor Regulations define "compensatory time" as
"paid time off the job which is earned and accrued by an employee in lieu of
immediate cash payment for employment in excess of the statutory hours for
which overtime compensation is required by section 7 of the FLSA." 29 C.F.R.
§ 553.22 (1990).
5. Act of Nov. 13, 1985, Pub. L. 99-150, §§ 2(a), 3(a)-(c)(1), 99 Stat. 787,
788-89 (1985).
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 207(o)(2)(A)(i), (ii) (1988); see infra notes 30-41 and ac-
companying text (discussing the text and scope of the agreement
requirements).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 207(o)(2)(A)(i) (1988).
8. Mdi § 207(o)(2)(A)(ii).
9. The text of subclause (ii) provides that it covers all those employees
not covered under subclause (i). Id. Subclause (i), however, does not define
which employees it covers. Id § 207(o)(2)(A)(i). It speaks only of an agree-
ment between the employer and the representative of its employees. Id. It
does not give any indication concerning when employees have a representa-
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concerning the FLSA's agreement requirement are similarly
unhelpful 1 0
Since the 1985 amendments, courts have struggled with the
application of this "agreement with representative" require-
ment.1 This Note argues that Congress did not intend the 1985
FLSA amendments to change existing state labor relations law
with respect to the definition of a collective bargaining repre-
sentative. Part I examines the text and legislative history of
the 1985 amendment and the conditions that influenced its pas-
sage. Part I also reviews the various systems of state labor rela-
tions present when Congress amended the FLSA. Part II
analyzes the cases construing the agreement requirement of the
1985 Act. Part III suggests that courts read the 1985 amend-
ments as requiring an agreement between the state and the em-
ployees' representative only when such an agreement would be
consistent with the state's existing system of public employee
employer relations. This Note therefore proposes that states be
allowed to use the compensatory time option pursuant to agree-
ments with individual employees, unless the applicable state la-
bor relations law or practice provides a clearly defined
obligation to bargain with the employees' representative, or un-
less the state or local government has engaged in past, court-
approved, collective negotiation.
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND CONTEXT
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Fair Labor Standards Act provides minimum wage and
maximum hour protections for approximately three-fourths of
people employed in the United States.12 The FLSA forbids
tive. See infra notes 38-41 and accompanying text (discussing possible inter-
pretations of § 207(o)(2)(A)(i)).
10. See infra notes 44-49 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative
history and the implementing regulations for the 1985 amendments).
11. See infra notes 70-102 and accompanying text.
12. See H.R. REP. NO. 331, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1985) [hereinafter H.R.
REP. No. 331]; see also Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 1, 52 Stat.
1060, 1063 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988)). The FLSA reg-
ulates the wages and hours of employees engaged in interstate commerce or
the production of goods for commerce by mandating minimum wages and re-
quiring that employers pay premiums for hours worked in excess of the statu-
tory maximum. The maximum hours provision states that:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, no employer shall em-
ploy any of his employees who in any workweek is engaged in com-
merce or in the production of goods for commerce, or is employed in
an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce, for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such em-
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covered private employers from granting compensatory time to
their employees in lieu of cash payments for overtime
worked.13 As originally enacted, however, the FLSA did not
apply to states or their political subdivisions.1 4 Because they
were not covered by the FLSA, state and local governments
were free to award compensatory time to their employees for
overtime worked.'5
In 1974, however, Congress amended the FLSA, extending
the Act's reach to most state and local employees. 16 The Na-
tional League of Cities quickly challenged the 1974 amend-
ployee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the
hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one half times
the regular rate at which he is employed.
29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (1988).
13. The Secretary of Labor had ruled that compensatory time could not
be used in lieu of overtime wages for employers and employees covered by the
FLSA. See H.R. REP. No. 331, supra note 12, at 19. Even if the Secretary
would have allowed such use of compensatory time, however, earlier court de-
cisions had effectively outlawed the use of compensatory time for those em-
ployees covered by the Act. See Walling v. Harnischfeger Co., 325 U.S. 427
(1945). In Walling, the Court said that the overtime requirements meant that
any compensatory time awarded in lieu of overtime pay would have to be
taken during the pay period in which the overtime hours were worked. Thus,
employees could not "bank" compensatory time for future use. Id at 435. Be-
cause it is unlikely that employees would be able to take time off during a pay
period in which they had worked overtime, compensatory time is of little
value to those employers whose employees are covered by the FLSA.
14. Initially, state and local government employees were not included in
the definition of employees covered by the Act. Furthermore, such agencies
were not defined as employers covered by the Act. Moreover, the Act con-
tained a specific exemption from its provisions for state and local government
employees. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 376, 52 Stat. 1060 (originally
codified at 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1940)), provisions repealed by Act of Apr. 8,
1974, Pub. L. 93-259, § 6(a)(1), 88 Stat. 58, 64.
15. In 1974, Congress amended the FLSA, extending its coverage to nearly
all state and local government employees. States therefore could not grant
compensatory time. See Act of Apr. 8, 1974, Pub. L. 93-259, § 6(a)(1), 88 Stat.
58, 64. This restriction, however, lasted for only two years. The application of
the FLSA to the states was quickly declared unconstitutional in National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976). See infra notes 18-20 and
accompanying text. Until the Supreme Court's 1985 decision in Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), states effectively
were able to grant compensatory time.
16. Congress in 1966 had extended FLSA protection to certain state and
local employees. The 1966 amendments extended FLSA coverage to state and
local government employees employed in hospitals, schools, and mass transit
operations. Act of Sept. 23, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 102(b), 80 Stat. 830, 831-
32. In 1974, Congress expanded the definition of "employer" to include public
agencies. Act of Apr. 8, 1974, Pub. L. 93-259, § 6(a)(1), 88 Stat. 58, 64. The 1974
amendments provide that the FLSA covers all state and local employees who
are not specifically exempted from its wage and hour provisions. See id-
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ments on constitutional grounds. In the 1976 case of National
League of Cities v. Usery,17 the Supreme Court held that the
1974 amendments violated the tenth amendment.18 The Court
concluded that federal laws that interfere with the states' per-
formance of "traditional government functions" violate the con-
cepts of federalism embodied in the tenth amendment. 19
According to the Court, the application of the FLSA to the
states would interfere with traditional aspects of state sover-
eignty by dictating how states should allocate state resources
and deliver essential state services. As a result of National
League of Cities, the FLSA no longer applied to state and local
governments. Freed from the constraints of the FLSA, many
states and municipalities either developed or reincarnated the
practice of awarding compensatory time for overtime hours
worked.20
National League of Cities spawned much litigation over the
definition of a "traditional government function."'1 The lower
federal courts found the "traditional government functions"
standard particularly difficult to apply in individual cases.22 In
1985, the Supreme Court responded to the problems caused by
National League of Cities by overruling the case in Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.s Specifically,
the Garcia Court held that the FLSA could constitutionally ap-
ply to states and their political subdivisions.24 The decision
17. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
18. I& at 852. The complaint in National League of Cities was not that
Congress had exceeded its power to regulate commerce in extending FLSA
coverage to employees of state and local governments, but that the tenth
amendment affirmatively prevented the exercise of that power. Id. at 837.
The Court stated: "We hold that insofar as the challenged amendments oper-
ate to directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in
areas of traditional government functions, they are not within the authority
granted Congress by Art. I, § 8, cl. 3." Id. at 852.
19. Id.
20. See S. REP. No. 159, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8, reprinted in 1985 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 651, 655-56 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 159].
21. See, e.g., EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 232 (1983); Federal Energy
Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 750 (1982); Transportation
Union v. Long Island R.R. Co., 455 U.S. 678, 688 (1982); Hodel v. Indiana, 452
U.S. 314, 323 (1981); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n,
452 U.S. 264, 272 (1981); Florida Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v.
Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 155 (1981).
22. See generally H.R. REP. No. 331, supra note 12, at 18 (discussing these
problems).
23. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
24. Id at 556. In Garcia, the Supreme Court initially granted certiorari to
determine whether public transportation constituted a "traditional govern-
ment function" as contemplated by the National League of Cities decision. 469
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rested both on a determination that the "traditional govern-
ment functions" standard was unworkableas and on a changed
view of federalism: that the political process, not the tenth
amendment, served to protect state sovereignty from intrusive
congressional action.26 Under Garcia, then, state and local gov-
ernments became subject to the overtime compensation re-
quirements of the FLSA. After Garcia, the Department of
Labor quickly adopted guidelines to ensure state and local gov-
ernment compliance with the FLSA.2
U.S. at 536. Without deciding that issue, the Court ordered that the case be re-
argued on the issue of whether National League of Cities should be overruled.
I&.
25. The Court noted that it was impossible to state a coherent principle to
explain the outcome of cases decided in the lower federal courts applying the
"traditional government function" standard. Id. at 538. The Court also stated
that none of the tests proposed in lower court cases to distinguish between
state activities Congress could regulate and those it could not seemed worka-
ble. Id. at 545.
26. Id at 552, 556. The Court's real reason for overturning National
League of Cities was that the decision rested upon an improper conception of
the role of the courts in a federal system. I& at 546. Allowing the federal
government to decide which state functions were traditional allowed the fed-
eral government to decide which state policy decisions it preferred. Id
Therefore, in determining the scope of a state's protection from intrusions
by the federal government, the Court rejected the idea that it could use "free-
standing conceptions of state sovereignty." Id at 550. The Court instead con-
cluded that state integrity was to be protected by the structure of the federal
government and the opportunity of the states to influence the composition of
the federal government. Id. at 552. The Court stated:
Of course, we continue to recognize that the States occupy a special
and specific position in our constitutional system and that the scope of
authority under the Commerce Clause must reflect that position. But
the principle and basic limit on the federal commerce power is that
inherent in all congressional action - the built-in restraints that our
system provides through state participation in federal governmental
action. The political process ensures that laws that unduly burden the
States will not be promulgated.
I& at 556.
27. The Department of Labor concluded that the effective date of the
Garcia decision, April 15, 1985, would be the date from which the Department
would measure compliance. Brock, The Application of the FLSA to State and
Local Governments, 36 LABOR L.J. 739, 740 (1985). The Department said it
would begin investigating compliance with the FLSA on October 15, 1985, for
those state and local entities that had been considered "traditional" under Na-
tional League of Cities, and would assess backpay beginning from April 15,
1985. Id. at 741. The Department also concluded that it could not delay the
application of Garcia, phase it in over time, or revise overtime provisions for
police and firefighters in order to relieve the burden on states and local agen-
cies. Id- The Department believed that the legislative history of the Act did
not allow them to make these kinds of adjustments. Id-
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B. TEXT OF THE 1985 AMENDMENTS
The costs of immediate compliance with the FLSA, partic-
ularly the provisions requiring overtime payment, seriously
concerned many state and local governments. 28 In light of
these concerns,2 9 Congress amended the FLSA overtime provi-
sions in 1985.30 Congress sought to relieve states of part of the
28. See H.R. REP. No. 331, supra note 12, at 17-18.
29. The Senate Report states:
In particular, in the wake of Garcia, the States and their political
subdivisions have identified several respects in which they would be
injured by immediate application of the FLSA....
The Committee recognizes that the financial costs of coming into
compliance with the FLSA - particularly the overtime provisions of
section 7 - are a matter of grave concern to many states and locali-
ties. We have received extensive testimony on this subject from rep-
resentatives of state and local governments and organized labor.
Although the testimony reflects sharp disagreements as to the nature
and context of FLSA compliance costs, the Committee concludes that
states and localities required to comply with the FLSA will be forced
to assume additional financial responsibilities which in at least some
instances could be substantial.
The committee also is cognizant that many state and local govern-
ment employers and their employees voluntarily have worked out ar-
rangements providing for compensatory time off in lieu of pay for
hours worked beyond the normally scheduled work week. These ar-
rangements - frequently the result of collective bargaining, reflect
mutually satisfactory solutions that are both fiscally and socially re-
sponsible. To the extent practicable, we wish to accommodate such
arrangements.
S. REP. No. 159, supra note 20, at 7-8, 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at
655-56.
With respect to the costs of compliance with the FLSA, a letter to the
Senate committee from Rudolph Penner, director of Congressional Budget Of-
fice, stated that "[o]ur preliminary analysis, based on information from over 30
states, communities, and concerned organizations, indicates that full applica-
tion of the FLSA wage and overtime provisions as required by [the Garcia] de-
cision would result in initial annual compliance costs totalling between 0.5 to
1.5 billion nationwide." Letter from Rudolph G. Penner to Senate Committee
on Labor and Human Resources (Oct. 15, 1985), reprinted in S. REP. No. 159,
supra note 21, at 16, 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs at 664.
The House Report contained almost identical language regarding the bur-
dens and costs of the Garcia decision. See H.R. REP. No. 331, supra note 12, at
18-19.
30. Act of Nov. 14, 1985, Pub. L. 99-150, § 2(a), 99 Stat. 787, 789 (codified at
29 U.S.C. § 207(o) (1988)). The statute provides, in pertinent part:
(o) Compensatory time
(1) Employees of a public agency which is a State, a political subdivi-
sion of a State, or an interstate governmental agency may receive, in
accordance with this subsection and in lieu of overtime compensation,
compensatory time off at a rate not less than one and one-half hours
for each hour of employment for which overtime compensation is re-
quired by this section.
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burden of compliance with the FLSA overtime provisions,
while still protecting public employees who work overtime.3'
The 1985 amendments accomplish this dual purpose by al-
lowing state and municipal governments to agree with their
employees to award compensatory time32 in lieu of monetary
payments for overtime.33 Furthermore, the 1985 amendments
require that state and local governments award compensatory
time at a rate not lower than one and one-half hour for every
overtime hour an employee works.34 Failure to abide by these
conditions subjects a state or local government to liability for
double the overtime compensation owed and invalidates the
public employer's compensatory time plan.3s
(2) A public agency may provide compensatory time under paragraph
(1) only -
(A) pursuant to
(i) applicable provisions of a collective bargaining agreement,
memorandum of understanding, or any other agreement be-
tween the public agency and the representatives of such em-
ployees; or
(ii) in the case of employees not covered by subclause (i), an
agreement or understanding arrived at between the employer
and employees before the performance of the work; and
(B) if the employee has not accrued compensatory time in excess
of the limit applicable to the employee proscribed by paragraph
(3).
In the case of employees described in clause (A)(ii) hired prior to
April 15, 1986, the regular practice in effect on April 15, 1986, with re-
spect to compensatory time off for such employees in lieu of the re-
ceipt of overtime compensation, shall constitute an agreement or
understanding under clause (A)(ii). Except as provided in the previ-
ous sentence, the provision of compensatory time off to such employ-
ees for hours worked after April 14, 1986, shall be in accordance with
this subsection.
Id.
31. Congress passed the 1985 amendments to relieve states of the burden
of full compliance with FISA overtime provisions. The stated purpose for the
amendments was "to provide flexibility to state and local governments and an
element of choice to their employees regarding compensation for statutory
overtime hours worked by covered employees." H.R. REP. No. 331, supra note
12, at 19.
32. Act of Nov. 13, 1985, Pub. L. 99-150, §§ 2(a), 3(a)-(c)(1), 99 Stat. 787,
789 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 207(o)(2)(A)(i) (1988)); see also supra note 4 (defin-
ing compensatory time).
33. Act of Nov. 13, 1985, Pub. L. 99-150, §§ 2(a), 3(a)-(c)(1), 99 Stat. 787,
789 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 207(o)(2)(A)(i) (1988)); see also infra notes 44-45
and accompanying text (explaining relevant provisions of the House and Sen-
ate Committee Reports).
34. Act of Nov. 13, 1985, Pub. L. 99-150, § 2(a) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 207(o)(1) (1988)). The time and a half provision for compensatory time par-
allels the requirement for overtime wages under the FLSA. Cf 29 U.S.C.
§ 207(a)(1) (1988) (quoted supra note 12).
35. The penalties section of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216 (1988), provides in
1991] 1813
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The FLSA amendments requires public sector employers
to enter into compensatory time agreements with their employ-
ees before the employees log any overtime.3 6 Such an agree-
ment may take one of two forms. Section 207(o)(2)(A)(i) of the
FLSA provides that states and municipalities may make com-
pensatory time agreements pursuant to "applicable provisions
of a collective bargaining agreement, memorandum of under-
standing, or any other agreement between the public agency
and representatives of such employees." 37  Section 207(o)
(2)(A)(ii) provides that, in cases of employees not covered by
subclause (i), state and local governments may grant their em-
ployees compensatory time pursuant to "an agreement or un-
derstanding arrived at between the employer and employee
before the performance of the work. s3 8 Thus, if employees are
covered by subclause (i), and the state does not reach agree-
ment with the employees' representative, the state may not
grant compensatory time. If subclause (i) does not cover the
employees, the state may agree with individual employees to
grant compensatory time, or may continue granting compensa-
tory time under a plan created before the effective date of the
1985 amendments to the FLSA.3 9
The FLSA, however, does not clearly define when each
section applies. Although section 207(o)(2)(A)(ii) applies to
"employees not covered by subclause (i),"40  section
207(o)(2)(A)(i) does not explicitly state which public employees
it covers.41 Rather, it speaks only in terms of the type of agree-
pertinent part: "Any employer who violates the provisions of section 206 or
section 207 of this title [29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207] shall be liable to the employee or
employees affected in the amount of their... unpaid overtime compensation,
... and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages." I&L § 216(b).
36. Id- § 207(o)(2)(A)(i); see also supra note 30 (quoting text of section
involved).
37. 29 U.S.C. § 207(o)(2)(A)(i) (1988).
38. Id § 207(o)(2)(A)(ii).
39. Section 207(o)(2)(B) allows employers to continue granting compensa-
tory time to employees who were hired before the effective date of the 1985
amendments. This exception, however, applies only to those employees with
whom the state could reach individual compensatory time agreements under
subclause (ii). I& Compensatory time plans commenced before the effective
date of the amendments must, however, comply with all other requirements of
the amendments, including the time and a half provision. Id
40. Id § 207(o)(2)(A)(ii).
41. Subclause (i) does not explicitly define what kind of employees are
covered by the FLSA. It states that compensatory time may be awarded pur-
suant to "applicable provisions of a collective bargaining agreement, memoran-
dum of understanding, or any other agreement between the public agency and
the representatives of such employees." Id § 207(o)(2)(A)(i). Unfortunately,
1814 [Vol. 75:1807
LABOR LAW
ment a state must have with its employees. Congress's failure
to clearly define when a state may agree with individual em-
ployees concerning compensatory time, and when it must agree
with its employees' representative, has led to much confusion
and litigation.
C. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY CONCERNING THE SCOPE OF SECTION
207(o)(2)(A)(i) OF THE FLSA
There is little direct legislative history concerning the rela-
tionship between sections 207(o)(2)(A)(i) and 207(o)(2)(A)(ii)
of the 1985 amendments. The conference report on the bill
does not even mention the issue.4 Both the House and Senate
committee reports, however, suggest that the presence or ab-
sence of a representative, and not an agreement, is the trigger-
ing event for the application of section 207(o)(2)(A)(i). 43 The
committee reports from the two houses do differ in important
respects, however, concerning the kind of representative re-
quired to trigger the application of section 207(o)(2)(A)(i). The
House Report states that section 207(o)(2)(A)(i) refers to a rep-
resentative "designated" by the employees." In contrast, the
Senate Report states that the representative must be one
the FLSA does not define when such agreement is required. The courts that
have considered the issue have differed as to what triggers the application of
subclause (i) and thus the requirement of agreement with the employee's rep-
resentative. See infra notes 70-102 and accompanying text.
42. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 357, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1985
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMN. NEws 668 [hereinafter H.R. CONF. REP. No. 357].
43. The House Committee Report states that
The use of compensatory time in lieu of cash must be pursuant to
some form of agreement or understanding between the employer and
the employee, or notice to the employee, prior to the performance of
the work. Where employees have selected a representative, which
need not be a formal or recognized collective bargaining agent as long
as it is a representative designated by the employees, the agreement or
understanding must be between the representative and the employer,
either through collective bargaining, through a memorandum of un-
derstanding or other type of agreement. Where employees do not
have a representative, the agreement or understanding must be be-
tween the employer and the individual.
H.R. REP. No. 331, supra note 12, at 20 (emphasis added). The Senate Report
concludes that "[w]here the employees do not have a recognized representa-
tive, the agreement or understanding must be between the employer and the
individual employee." S. REP. No. 159, supra note 20, at 10, 1985 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 658 (emphasis added).
44. The House Report explained the meaning of representative as follows:
"Where employees have selected a representative, which need not be a formal
or recognized collective bargaining agent as long as it is a representative desig-
nated by the employees, the agreement or understanding must be between the
representative and the employer .... ." H.R. REP. No. 331, supra note 12, at 20.
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"recognized" by the state or agency to trigger the section
207(o)(2)(A)(i) agreement requirement.4
Other sources of legislative history have figured signifi-
cantly in the courts' interpretation of the relationship between
sections 207(o)(2)(A)(i) and 207(o)(2)(A)(ii). For example, the
implementing regulations6 promulgated by the Secretary of
Labor refer to a "designated" representative.47 Comments to
the regulations also provide that state law should control the
question of what constitutes a representative for the purposes
of section 207(o)(2)(A)(i).a s Courts also have cited a post-enact-
45. The Senate report referred to representative in the following terms:
"Where employees do not have a recognized representative, the agreement or
understanding must be between the employer and the individual employee."
S. REP. No. 159, supra note 21, at 10, 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADUN. NEws at
658. Every court of appeals that has considered this issue has determined that
"recognized" representative means a group that the state somehow has agreed
to meet with for purposes of deciding compensatory time issues. See infra
notes 76-91 and accompanying text.
46. The Department of Labor Regulations are rules promulgated pursu-
ant to authority granted in § 6 of the 1985 amendments to the FLSA, which
provided that the Department of Labor has power to issue "such regulations as
are required to implement such amendments." Act of Nov. 13, 1985, Pub. L.
99-150, § 6, 99 Stat. 787, 790. The Department of Labor issued preliminary reg-
ulations in 1986, followed by a public comment period. See 51 Fed. Reg. 13,402
(1986). Some of the regulations were changed following the comment period,
and the Department issued final regulations in September, 1987. See 52 Fed.
Reg. 2014-15 (1987). The present regulations are codified at 29 C.F.R. § 553.23
(1990).
47. The regulations reach
Where employees have a representative, the agreement or under-
standing concerning the use of compensatory time must be between
the representative and the public agency either through a collective
bargaining agreement or through a memorandum of understanding or
other type of oral or written agreement. In the absence of a collective
bargaining agreement applicable to the employees, the representative
need not be a formal or recognized bargaining agent as long as the
representative is designated by the employees. Any agreement must
be consistent with the provisions of section 7(o) of the Act.
29 C.F.R. § 553.23(b)(1) (1990) (emphasis added).
48. The comments to the regulations state:
The Department believes that the proposed rule accurately reflects
the statutory requirement that a [collective bargaining agreement],
memorandum of understanding or other agreement be reached be-
tween the public agency and the representatives of the employees
where the employees have designated a representative. Where the
employees do not have a representative, the agreement must be be-
tween the employer and the individual employees. The Department
recognizes that there is a wide variety of State law that may be perti-
nent in this area. It is the Department's intention that the question of
whether employees have a representative for purposes of FLSA sec-




ment letter from sponsors of the 1985 amendments to the
Secretary of Labor agreeing with the Labor Department's
interpretation of representative as a "designated" repre-
sentative.49
D. THE STATE LABOR RELATIONS LAW CONTEXT
When Congress passed the 1985 amendments to the FLSA,
it noted that states and municipalities had a wide variety of la-
bor relations laws.sa Unlike the private sector, no overarching
federal framework exists to regulate labor relations between
states and their employees.5 L The National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA), 52 which regulates private sector collective bar-
gaining, does not apply to public sector employment relation-
52 Fed. Reg. 2014-15 (1987).
49. See Abbott v. City of Virginia Beach, 879 F.2d 132, 135 (10th Cir. 1989),
cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 854 (1990); Jacksonville Professional Fire Fighters
Ass'n v. Jacksonville, 685 F. Supp. 513, 522 (E.D.N.C. 1988). The letter reads in
pertinent part:
Section 2 of the 1985 Amendments provides that state and local
governments may use compensatory time in lieu of cash payment for
overtime only after certain conditions are met. Among those condi-
tions is the agreement of representatives of the employees involved
where such employees have designated a representative. (See FLSA
Section 7(o)(2)(A)(i), as added by Section 2(a) of the 1985 Amend-
ments.) We were careful in developing the amendment to be clear
that the representative need not be a formally recognized collective
bargaining representative and that recognition by the employer was
not required ....
It is the employees' designation, and not the employer's recogni-
tion or attitude toward that representative, that is vital. FLSA Sec-
tion 7(o)(2)(A)(i) was specifically drafted to avoid any requirement of
formal recognition. During the consideration of the legislation, spe-
cific references were made to a number of states where NLRA collec-
tive bargaining style recognition does not exist; but where large
numbers of fire, police, and general public employees belong to labor
organizations. We intended the FLSA requirement of an agreement
on compensatory time to apply in those situations.
Letter from Principal Drafters of 1985 FLSA Amendments to the Department
of Justice (Sept. 26, 1986), quoted in Jacksonville Professional Fire Fighters,
685 F. Supp. at 522 (emphasis added).
50. Id.
51. The National Labor Relations Act provides a uniform federal scheme
for labor relations in the private sector. National Labor Relations (Wagner)
Act of 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169
(1988)). There is no federal legislation concerning state and local government
labor relations. See R. KEARNEY, LABOR RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 49-
53 (1984). In the mid-1970s, Congress considered several bills that would have
created a uniform national labor relations system for state and local govern-
ments. None of these bills became law. Id
52. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act of 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988)).
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ships.53 Although courts have held that public employees have
a constitutional right to form and join labor unions,5 they have
also held that states are not constitutionally required to bargain
with those unions.sa
By 1984, twenty-six states had enacted collective bargaining
systems similar to that mandated by the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, covering all categories of public sector employees.s6
These systems grant public sector employees the right to organ-
ize and bargain collectively, much like the NLRA.s7 These
states also require both parties to bargain in good faith with re-
spect to terms and conditions of employment, traditionally
mandatory subjects of bargaining under the NLRA.58 There
53. The NLRA specifically exempts public employers from its coverage.
See id. § 2(2), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1988).
54. Courts have held that the first amendment right to freedom of associ-
ation includes the right to form and join labor unions. See, e.g., Lontine v. Van-
Cleave, 483 F.2d 966, 967 (10th Cir. 1973); AFSCME v. Woodward, 406 F.2d 137,
139 (8th Cir. 1969); McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287, 288 (7th Cir. 1968).
55. Courts have uniformly held that public employers are not required to
bargain collectively with their employees. See, e.g., Smith v. Arkansas State
Highway Employees, Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463, 465 (1979) (per curiam) ("[Tihe
First Amendment does not impose any affirmative obligation on the govern-
ment to listen, to respond or, in this context, to recognize the association and
bargain with it."). Courts have not found equal protection violations where
states allow bargaining by some employees, but not by others. See, e.g., Bever-
lin v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 722 F.2d 395, 396 (8th Cir. 1983) (no equal pro-
tection violation for state to allow bargaining by some employees and not
others); Hanover Township Fed'n of Teachers, Local 1954 v. Hanover Commu-
nity School Corp., 457 F.2d 456, 461-62 (7th Cir. 1972) (same); Newport News
Fire Fighters Ass'n, Local 794 v. City of Newport News, 339 F. Supp. 13, 16
(E.D. Va. 1972) (same); Indianapolis Educ. Ass'n v. Lewallen, 72 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2071, 2072 (1969) (same).
56. See R. KEARNEY, supra note 51, at 54-55. States with comprehensive,
NLRA style collective bargaining policies include: Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa,
Maine, Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey, New York, South Dakota, Wash-
ington, and Wisconsin. Id Other states provide for "local options" for munici-
pal employees, police, and firefighters. Id For specific statutory references,
see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 447.201-.609 (West 1991); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 89.1-
.20 (1985); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E (1989); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§§ 3-18-1 to 3-18-17 (1987).
57. Most state statutes declare that public employees have the right to or-
ganize and bargain collectively. R. KEARNEY, supra note 51, at 55-57; Befort,
Public Sector Bargaining: Fiscal Crisis and Unilateral Change, 69 MANN. L.
REV. 1221, 1230 (1985).
58. Under the NLRA, parties are required to bargain over wages, hours
and other terms and conditions of employment. National Labor Relations Act
§ 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988). In First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB,
452 U.S. 666 (1981), the Supreme Court held that parties must bargain over a
term of employment when the benefit to labor management relations and the
collective bargaining process outweigh the burden placed on the employer's
business. 452 U.S. at 679. According to Professor Befort, most public sector
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are, however, significant differences in some of these systems.5 9
Some states provide for bargaining only by certain classes of
employees.6 0 Others allow local employees, but not state em-
ployees, to bargain collectively. 61
Other states have no comprehensive public-sector bargain-
ing policies at all.62 Traditionally, courts have held that in the
absence of authorizing legislation, public sector employers have
no power to enter collective bargaining agreements with their
employees.6 3 Despite this general rule, however, at least three
states without legislated collective bargaining policies have up-
held voluntary collectively bargained agreements between em-
ployees and municipalities.6 On the other hand, at least three
southern states prohibit any form of collective bargaining be-
tween public employers and their employees.6 5 These states re-
fuse to honor even voluntary agreements between public
employees and employers.6 6
Finally, some states mandate a "meet and confer" system
decisions apply similar rules with respect to duty to bargain. Befort, supra
note 57, at 1230-34. Many states, however, restrict the mandatory subjects of
bargaining more strictly than does the NLRA. I- at 1223.
59. See R. KEARNEY, supra note 51, at 53; see also Developments in the
Law: Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1611, 1676 (1984) [hereinafter
Developments].
60. See ALA. CODE § 1143-143 (1990) (firefighters); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-
5-611 (1990) (teachers); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5154c-1 (Vernon 1989)
(firefighters and police); Wyo. STAT. § 27-10-104 (1987) (firefighters).
61. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 288.010-.070 (1987).
62. States without comprehensive policies include Arizona, Arkansas, Col-
orado, and Utah. R. KEARNEY, supra note 51, at 55-57.
63. See Befort, supra note 57, at 1232-33.
64. Colorado, Louisiana, and Ohio have upheld collective bargaining ar-
rangements in the absence of statutory schemes. See R. KEARNEY, supra note
51, at 75 n.4; see also, e.g., Littleton Educ. Ass'n v. Arapahoe County School
Dist. No. 6, 191 Colo. 411, 416, 553 P.2d 793, 797 (1976). In North Dakota, un-
ions bargain with public employers pursuant to an Attorney General's opinion.
See R. KEARNEY, supra note 51, at 57.
65. States prohibiting collective bargaining are Georgia, North Carolina,
and Virginia. R. KEARNEY, supra note 51, at 56-57. These states find that col-
lective bargaining violates public policy by delegating away the legislative
function. Id According to some commentators, this characterization is mis-
leading because collective negotiations, although contrary to public policy in
these states, do occur to some extent in all of them. See Nolan, Public Em-
ployee Unionism in the Southeast. The Legal Parameters, 29 S.C.L. REV. 235,
287 (1978); Developments, supra note 59, at 1679-80; Note, Public Employee
Bargaining in North Carolina: From Paternalism to Confusion, 59 N.C.L.
REV. 214, 228 (1980).
66. See Chatham Ass'n of Educators v. Board of Pub. Educ., 231 Ga. 806,
807-08, 204 S.E.2d 138, 13940 (1974); Commonwealth v. County Bd. of Arling-
ton County, 217 Va. 558, 573, 232 S.E.2d 30, 40 (1977); see also N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 95-98 (1989) (prohibiting collective bargaining).
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of labor relations, where the state or local employer must meet
with its employees or their representative over certain issues,
but retains sole final decisionmaking power.67 Meet and confer
states vary from requiring the government entity merely to
convey employee proposals to the legislature or other decision-
making body,68 to requiring bargaining that approaches that of
NLRA-style jurisdictions.6 9
67. States providing for meet and confer bargaining include: Alabama,
California (local government employees), and Missouri. Developments, supra
note 59, at 1680. One commentator described meet and confer bargaining rela-
tions as follows:
Meet and confer is an approach peculiar to the public sector. It im-
plicitly rejects the legitimacy of transferring private sector bargaining
rights to public employment in that meet and confer constitutes a de-
nial of true bilateral decision making by equal parties. Under meet-
and-confer policies there is no obligation on the part of the employer
to negotiate and sign a written agreement. Rather, the employer re-
tains final decision-making authority. Furthermore, meet and confer
laws typically are less comprehensive in their treatment of such labor
relations issues as unit determination, representation, administrative
frameworks, dispute settlements, and unfair labor practices. Whereas
meet and confer is favored by management oriented organizations
like the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, un-
ions argue that meet and confer more closely approximates 'collective
begging' than collective bargaining.... In reality, most states have
adopted a modified approach in bilateral relations which falls some-
where in between the ideal models of meet and confer and collective
bargaining. In practice, it often is not an easy matter to distinguish
between the two, and the trend definitely is toward the collective bar-
gaining model.
R. KEARNEY, supra note 51, at 62. Other commentators underscore the slip-
pery line between meet and confer bargaining policies and pure collective bar-
gaining policies. See Edwards, The Emerging Duty to Bargain in the Public
Sector, 71 MICH. L. REv. 885, 896-99 (1973) (distinguishing between collective
bargaining and meet and confer statutes and concluding that the two ap-
proaches are not as far apart as they seem); Developments, supra note 59, at
1679-80 (same).
68. The Missouri statute has been construed to merely require the public
employer to convey the employee proposal to the legislature or other decision
making body. See State ex rel. Missey v. City of Cabool, 441 S.W.2d 35, 41 (Mo.
1969) (construing Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 105.500-.530 (Vernon Supp. 1989)). The
Alabama statute concerning meet and confer rights of firefighters similarly
grants employees the right to "present proposals." See ALA. CODE § 11-43-143
(1989). This code has been construed to allow the public employer and the
firefighters to reach a voluntary agreement, but not to compel them "to nego-
tiate toward a labor contract as the terms are generally understood in the field
of labor and management." Nichols v. Bolding, 291 Ala. 50, 57, 277 So. 2d. 868,
873 (1973). The public employer is required to consider employee proposals in
good faith. Id
69. The Kansas statute speaks of "meeting and conferring," KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 75-4324 (1989), but imposes a "mutual obligation" on the public employ-
ees and employer to "endeavor to reach agreement," id § 75-4322(m). The
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II. APPELLATE COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF
SECTION 207(o)(2)(A)(i)
The circuit courts have considered three main issues in de-
termining whether state and local governments may enter into
compensatory time agreements with individual employees, or
whether they must agree with the employees' representative to
grant compensatory time: (1) whether the triggering event for
application of section 207(o)(2)(A)(i) is the presence of an
agreement or the presence of a representative; (2) whether the
"representative" referred to in section 207(o)(2)(A)(i) is "any"
representative designated by the employees or a representative
authorized or "recognized" under state law; and (3) whether
the agreement entered into must be a collective bargaining
agreement authorized under state law. This section discusses
each issue in turn.
A. THE TRIGGERING EVENT FOR SECTION 207(o)(2)(A)(i):
REPRESENTATIVE OR AGREEMENT?
The appellate courts that have considered the conditions
under which a state may grant compensatory time to its em-
ployees in lieu of overtime pay have raised questions as to
whether the presence of a representative or the presence of an
agreement with the employees' representative, triggers section
207(o)(2)(A)(i).
The Eleventh Circuit considered this issue in the 1989 case
Dillard v. Harris,70 holding that the presence or absence of an
agreement was the triggering event.71 In Local 2203 v. West
Kansas statute also provides for impasse resolution procedures rather than al-
lowing for unilateral employer decisionmaking. Id § 75-4332.
70. 885 F.2d 1549 (l1th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 210 (1990).
71. Id. at 1554. The Dillard court stateh
We are satisfied with the way the Fourth Circuit dealt with these ar-
guments [about whether § 207(o)(2)(a)(1) required a "recognized" or
"designated" representative] in Abbott v. City of Virginia Beach, stat-
ing that the statute was unclear and looking to the legislative his-
tory.... Equally satisfactory, in our judgment, would be this analysis:
the statute on its face is plain, and the legislative history does not
mandate a contrary interpretation.
Id at 1552 (citations omitted). The court also stated that:
Since we agree with the analysis [of the Fourth Circuit] ... we could
simply state that we are following that case and that the distinction in
facts between that case and this one does not dictate a different re-
sult.... Because this issue is surfacing in various courts which are
reaching divergent results, however a discussion of an alternative ap-
proach that reaches the same result may be appropriate.
Id at 1550. The Dillard court reasoned that the plain language of the statute
stated that employees are covered under § 207(o)(2)(A)(i) only if there is an
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Adams Fire Protection District,72 however, the Tenth Circuit
disagreed, holding that the presence or absence of a representa-
tive was the triggering event for the application of section
207(o)(2)(A)(i).73 Similarly, other courts considering the issue
have concluded that the presence or absence of a represen-
agreement between the state or local government and the employees' repre-
sentative. Id at 1552. If there were no agreement, § 207(o)(2)(A)(ii) controls,
and the state or local government could make compensatory time agreements
with individual employees. Further, no legislative history clearly expressed an
intent contrary to their reading of the plain language of the statute, the court
stated. Id. at 1553-54. Thus, the court concluded, the presence or absence of
an agreement is the triggering event. Id at 1554. The court based its conclu-
sion on its determination that the legislative history contained no clear answer
as to what effect the presence or absence of a representative would have on
whether employees were covered by § 207(o)(2)(A)(i) or § 207(o)(2)(A)(ii). Id
at 1553-54. Interestingly, the court determined that the differences between
the committee reports as to what kind of representative was needed showed
that Congress had not clearly determined what effect the presence or absence
of a representative would have. Id; see also supra notes 42-45 and accompany-
ing text (explaining the differing committee views).
The other courts considering the effect of the presence or absence of a
representative have concluded that because both committee reports mention
representative as a triggering event, representative is the triggering event. See
infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text. These courts viewed the differences
between House and Senate descriptions of representative when considering
the type of representative required; they did not determine that such differ-
ences created doubt as to whether the presence or absence of a representative
would be the triggering event. Id
72. 877 F.2d 814 (10th Cir. 1989).
73. I& at 818. The Local 2203 court first determined that the statute was
ambiguous as to whether § 207(o)(2)(A)(i) or § 207(o)(2)(A)(ii) applied in a
given situation. Id. at 816-17. The court noted that the details of the ambiguity
were as follows:
Subclause (i) may be read as applying only to those employees who
have a representative who has reached an agreement with the em-
ployer. In other words, employees are not covered by subclause (i) if
(a) they have a representative, but the representative fails to reach an
agreement with the employer, or (b) they have no representative. In
either case, subclause (ii) applies, and the employer may use compen-
satory time pursuant to a regular practice in effect on April 15, 1986.
Alternatively, subclause (i) may be read as covering all employees
who have a representative, even if the representative has not reached
an agreement with the employer. Subclause (ii) addresses employees
who have no representative. Therefore, for represented employees,
including those whose representative has failed to reach an agree-
ment, subclause (ii) is inapplicable and an employer's regular practice
does not constitute an agreement.
Id. at 817 n.1. The court concluded, based upon the legislative history, that
subclause (i) applied to those employees who had a representative, whether or
not there was an agreement between the state and the representative concern-
ing compensatory time. Id at 816-20. In Local 2203, the court relied upon the
Department of Labor's determination that the statute required agreement
over compensatory time if the employees had a proper representative. Id at
819. The court cited legislative history from both the Senate and House re-
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tative is the triggering event for application of section
207(o)(2)(A)(i).74 Thus, the consensus is that the presence or
absence of a representative is the triggering event for subclause
(i), and the main unresolved issue is the type of representative
required.
B. WHAT KIND OF REPRESENTATIVE IS REQUIRED?
Appellate courts have split over whether the representa-
tive required for application of section 207(o)(2)(A)(i) must be
recognized by the state or merely designated75 by the employ-
ees. In Local 2203 v. West Adams Fire Protection District,76 the
Tenth Circuit held that "representative," as used in section
207(o)(2)(A)(i), refers to a representative designated by the em-
ployees, whether or not the state has recognized that represen-
tative. 7 The court gave significant weight to regulations
promulgated by the Secretary of Labor that state that the rep-
resentative does not have to be recognized by the state. 8 Be-
cause the House Report to the 1985 amendments referred to a
"designated" representative,79 the Local 2203 court determined
that the Department of Labor's construction of the statute was
reasonable.8 0
The Fourth Circuit considered this issue in Abbott v. City
ports supporting this result. Id. For a discussion of the relevant legislative
history, see supra notes 31-43 and accompanying text.
74. Nevada Highway Patrol Ass'n v. Nevada, 899 F.2d 1549, 1553 (9th Cir.
1989); Abbott v. City of Virginia Beach, 879 F.2d 132, 135 (4th Cir. 1989), cert
denied, 110 S. Ct. 854 (1990). The Ninth Circuit explicitly followed the Tenth
Circuit's reasoning in its determination. Nevada Highway Patrol, 899 F.2d at
1553. Although not addressing the issue as clearly, the Fourth Circuit's analy-
sis shows that it considered the presence or absence of a representative to be
the triggering event. Abbott, 879 F.2d at 135.
75. In considering this issue, the courts have viewed a "designated repre-
sentative" as one chosen by the employees. The House Report to the 1985
amendments supports this view. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text
(quoting the legislative history).
76. 877 F.2d 814 (10th Cir. 1989).
77. Id. at 816-20.
78. Id, at 817-18.
79. H.R. REP. No. 331, supra note 12, at 20; see also supra note 44 (quoting
the text of the House Report).
80. Local 2203, 877 F.2d at 820. The Local 2203 court reached this conclu-
sion even though the Senate Report spoke of a recognized representative. The
court stated that: "Nonetheless, because of the support of the House report,
we find that the Department reasonably determined that employees are repre-
sented if they have merely designated a representative whom the employer
has failed to recognize." Id. The court also failed to consider the Labor De-
partment comments, see supra note 48, stating that the question of whether a
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of Virginia Beach.8 ' In Abbott, Virginia law specifically prohib-
ited the public employer from bargaining with its employees.8 2
The employees argued that the "other agreement" provisions3
of section 207(o)(2)(A)(i) required the state to reach agreement
with their representative concerning compensatory time be-
cause it was a "designated" representative.8 4
The Abbott court first determined that section
207(o)(2)(A)(i) does not define representatives 5 The court then
noted the discrepancy between the House Report, speaking of a
"designated" representative, and the Senate Report, referring
to a "recognized" representative.8 6 It held that the representa-
tive had to be a recognized representative, relying heavily on
administrative regulations stating that state law should deter-
mine whether the employees had a representative.8 7
representative existed would be decided with reference to state law. See id. at
816-20.
Courts generally give considerable weight to interpretations of statutes
given by agencies required to implement them. Courts uphold agency inter-
pretations as long as they are reasonable, even if the court would have reached
a different result on its own. See W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
803-15 (1987).
81. 879 F.2d 132 (4th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 854 (1990).
82. Id. at 134. In Abbott, the district court had held that § 207(o)(2)(A)(i)
only requires such an agreement "where state law permits state and local gov-
ernment entities to recognize representatives of their employees for collective
bargaining purposes." Id. at 134 (quoting Abbott v. City of Virginia Beach, 689
F. Supp. 600, 603 (E.D. Va. 1988), clf'd, 897 F.2d 132 (4th Cir. 1989), cert de-
nied, 110 S. Ct. 854 (1990)).
83. The 1985 amendments to the FLSA provide that compensatory time
may be granted pursuant to a "collective bargaining agreement, memorandum
of understanding, or any other agreement" between the employer and the rep-
resentative of the employees. Act of Nov. 13, 1985, Pub. L. 99-150, §§ 2(a),
3(a)-(c)(1), 99 Stat. 787, 789 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 207(o)(2)(A)(i) (1988)) (em-
phasis added).
84. Abbott, 879 F.2d at 134. In Abbott, members of the Virginia Beach po-
lice department belonged to two associations, one called the Virginia Beach
Policeman's Benevolent Association, the other known as the Virginia Beach
Police Sergeant's Association. Id. at 133. The police officers claimed that "rep-
resentative" included any designee of the employees and that the associations
represented them for compensatory time purposes. Id. at 134.
85. Id. at 135.
86. Id. at 134-35; see supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text (quoting
text of reports and explaining discrepancy).
87. Abbott, 879 F.2d at 136. The court first cited the regulations promul-
gated by the Department of Labor to implement the statute, which spoke of a
designated representative. Id. at 135; see supra note 47 (text of the regula-
tions). The court noted that the Secretary of Labor responded to concerns
that the proposed regulations for implementing § 207(o) would conflict with
some state labor relations laws by stating that state law would control on the
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The Abbott court rejected the interpretation of a post-en-
actment letter from the sponsors of the 1985 amendments
agreeing with the Secretary of Labor's interpretation of "repre-
sentative."8 8 The court noted that post-enactment letters by
legislators are entitled to little weight in determining statutory
meaning.8 9 Finally, it stated that the requirement of a recog-
nized representative comported best with the stated purpose of
the amendments: "to provide flexibility to state and local gov-
ernment employers and an element of choice to their employ-
ees regarding compensation for statutory overtime hours
worked by covered employees." 9
The Eleventh and Ninth Circuits have followed the Abbott
court's reasoning in holding that section 207(o)(2)(A)(i) re-
quires a recognized representative.9 1
C. WHAT TYPE OF AGREEMENT IS REQUIRED?
The circuit courts have split over whether a representative
issue whether a representative exists. Abbott, 879 F.2d at 136; see supra note
48 (quoting the text of the Secretary's comments).
88. Abbott, 879 F.2d at 135. For the text of the letter, see supra note 49.
89. Abbott, 879 F.2d at 136.
90. Id. at 136-37.
91. Nevada Employees Ass'n v. Bryan, 916 F.2d 1384 (9th Cir. 1990); Ne-
vada Highway Patrol Ass'n v. Nevada, 899 F.2d 1549, 1553 (9th Cir. 1989); Dil-
lard v. Harris, 885 F.2d 1549, 1550 (l1th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 210
(1990). The Eleventh Circuit held that a recognized representative was re-
quired, noting that the House Report supported the employees' argument
while the Senate Report supported the state. Dillard, 885 F.2d at 1554. The
court accepted the Senate's interpretation requiring a recognized representa-
tive. Id. The court cited no specific reasons why it chose the Senate Report's
interpretation. It stated:
On the other hand, the Senate committee report's use of the term
"recognized representative" tends to support the State's position that
the phrase means a representative with whom public agencies could
lawfully negotiate, so that when state law prohibits such negotiation
there can be no recognized representative. Since Georgia law prohib-
its state employers from recognizing third party representatives for
purposes of negotiating with them over employment conditions, the
employees lack the type of representative envisioned in subclause (i),
and thus subclause (ii) applies.
Id. (emphasis in original). Earlier in the opinion, the court did note that
where there is a conflict between the legislative history of the two houses, the
history from the house in which the bill was introduced is more authoritative.
These amendments were introduced in the Senate. Id. at 1552.
In two cases, the Ninth Circuit has held that a recognized representative is
required to trigger § 207(o)(2)(A)(i). Nevada Employees, 916 F.2d at 1390; Ne-
vada Highway Patrol, 899 F.2d at 1553. It also has agreed that "representa-
tive" should be defined with reference to state law. Bryan, 916 F.2d at 1390;
Nevada Highway Patrol, 899 F.2d at 1554.
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for section 207(o)(2)(A)(i) purposes must be authorized under
state law to enter collective bargaining agreements. The Elev-
enth Circuit considered the issue in Dillard v. Harris,92 holding
that "where state law prohibits agreements with employee rep-
resentatives, public employers may enter into individual over-
time agreements with employees."93 The court determined that
even though under Georgia law the state might recognize an
employee representative to meet and consult over labor issues,
the prohibition of collective bargaining agreements prevented
the state from entering the kind of "agreement" contemplated
in section 207(o)(2)(A)(i).94 It characterized the role of the em-
ployees as merely having input, and determined that that role
was insufficient to constitute the kind of agreement contem-
plated in section 207(o)(2)(A)(i).9 5 The Fourth Circuit, in Ab-
bott, reached the same conclusion as the Dillard court.9
Unlike the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits, however, the
Ninth circuit, in Nevada Employees Association v. Bryan 9 and
Nevada Highway Patrol Association v. Nevada,98 did not find
that the statute required the state to be able to enter an en-
forceable agreement with the employees' representative.9 In
92. 885 F.2d 1549 (11th Cir. 1989) (quoting Op. Ga. Att'y Gen. 457, 463-65
(1975)), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 210 (1990).
93. Id. at 1550.
94. Id. at 1555. The court summarized an attorney general's position pa-
per regarding the Georgia law:
"Although a state employer may not lawfully enter into a binding col-
lective bargaining contract with an employees representative," it may
if it so desires, "meet and consult" with the representative over
wages, hours, and conditions of employment and reach an understand-
ing, which the employer could then voluntarily adopt according to its
normal policy-making procedures without improperly delegating its




96. Abbott v. City of Virginia Beach, 879 F.2d 132, 136 (4th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 854 (1990).
97. 916 F.2d 1384 (9th Cir. 1990).
98. 899 F.2d 1549 (9th Cir. 1989).
99. In Nevada Highway Patrol, the court held that although subclause (i)
required that a representative be recognized by the state, the representative
did not have to be an authorized collective bargaining agent. The court stated
that "according to the Secretary [of Labor], unless state law is to the contrary,
an agreement under subsection (i), is operative if the employees have recog-
nized a representative." Id. at 1554. The court continued:
Accordingly, we must determine how Nevada law applies to this case.
Some employees are represented, but their representative has made
no agreement under section 207(o)(2)(A). If an agreement is pre-
cluded by state law we must then look to section 207(o)(2)(A)(ii). If
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Bryan, the court said that the fact that the state could only
meet with the representatives for discussion purposes did not
prevent the application of section 207(o)(2)(A)(i).1°° The two
an agreement is not precluded, the Secretary's interpretation of sec-
tion 207(o)(2)(A) would favor a holding that subclause (ii) agreements
are not available to the state in this case.
I&.
The court found that Nevada had no law specifically authorizing state em-
ployee bargaining. Id.; see also Bryan, 916 F.2d at 1390 (same). The court
noted also that "even if formal collective bargaining were prohibited, we find
no Nevada law supporting the proposition that, unless employees are specifi-
cally given permission, they cannot designate representatives to enter into
agreements or understandings with their employers." Nevada Highway Pa-
trol, 899 F.2d at 1554.
To bolster this conclusion, the Nevada Highway Patrol court pointed to a
1969 Assembly Concurrent Resolution that recognized the Nevada State Em-
ployees Association (NSEA) as the representative of its members "for pur-
poses of preserving and advancing their interests as state employees." Id. at
1554-55 (quoting Act of May 21, 1969, No. 29, 1969 Nev. Stat. 1732). The court
further noted that the Resolution advocated "preserving the rights of state
employees who are not members of such association to speak for themselves."
I&~
The Nevada Highway Patrol court, in a footnote, rejected the State's argu-
ment that, based on an opinion of the Nevada attorney general, state employ-
ees could not engage in collective bargaining and therefore could not have a
recognized representative. Id at 1554 n.6. The Attorney General issued this
opinion after Nevada passed a law allowing collective bargaining by local gov-
ernments and their employees. He reasoned that neither state nor local em-
ployees could bargain collectively before the law; because the law did not
apply to the state employees, they were still prohibited from bargaining collec-
tively. Id. The court noted that Attorney General opinions are not binding,
furthermore, they found that no Nevada law prevented the legislature from
recognizing an employee representative. Id.
The Bryan court also found the resolution creating the Nevada State Em-
ployees Association helpful in determining whether the employees had a rec-
ognized representative. "However, we recognized in Nevada Highway Patrol
that whether Nevada state employees were barred from collective bargaining
was unclear and that even if barred from collective bargaining, there was no
prohibition against designating a representative to enter into agreements with
the state." Bryan, 916 F.2d at 1390 (quoting Nevada Highway Patrol, 899 F.2d
at 1554 n.6). The Bryan court declined to follow the district court decision in
Abbott holding that the recognition of a group for discussion purposes only did
not constitute a recognized representative under the statute. Id. (citing Abbott
v. City of Virginia Beach, 689 F. Supp 600, 603 (E.D. Va. 1988), aff'd, 897 F.2d
132 (4th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 854 (1990)). The court supported
this decision by reference to the House report and the C.F.R. statements spe-
cifically saying that the representative need not be one authorized for collec-
tive bargaining. Id. The court also noted that the Department of Labor
changed the implementing regulations to specifically recognize that the repre-
sentative need not necessarily be an authorized collective bargaining agent. Id.
(quoting 52 Fed. Reg. 2014 (1987) (stating that the C.F.R. section referring to
the definition of a representative, 29 C.F.R. § 553.23(b)(1) (1990), was amended
to read "recognized or otherwise designated representative")).
100. Bryan, 916 F.2d at 1390.
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Ninth circuit cases reached differing results about whether the
state had to agree with the employees' representative. In
Bryan, the court held that the employees' representative was
recognized because the state legislature had named it the em-
ployees' representative; therefore, the state had to enter an
agreement with the employees' representative concerning com-
pensatory time.101 The employee organization in Nevada High-
way Patrol had not been so recognized and the court therefore
held in that case that the Highway Patrol could enter into com-
pensatory time agreements with individual employers. 02
III. ANALYSIS
In the 1985 amendments to the FLSA, Congress attempted
to balance several competing goals. First, it wanted to reduce
the monetary impact of overruling National League of Cities
that would result from the attendant imposition of the FLSA
regulations on states and municipalities 03 Second, Congress
recognized that many public employees regard compensatory
time as a welcome substitute to overtime, and prefer the extra
time off to cash payments10 4 Congress also realized that collec-
tive bargaining agreements govern many public employees, and
it wanted to avoid interfering with existing collective bargain-
ing processes.'05 Finally, at least some members of Congress
were concerned that even though constitutional, the FLSA still
imposed too great a burden on state and local governments.'16
Reading the compensatory time amendments to require
agreement with any representative designated by the employ-
ees conceivably could force the employer into a bargaining obli-
101. Id.
102. Nevada Highway Patrol, 899 F.2d at 1555.
103. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
105. Id. Congress also realized that some of these systems were not tradi-
tional NLRA-style collective bargaining systems. Id.
106. During the floor debates on the bill, Senator Wilson stated:
But I must tell you that while this is an improvement over what
would occur were there no such legislation - and a significant im-
provement - it is still but half a loaf. It, by no means, corrects Con-
gress' terrible transgression committed many years ago when we
passed the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
131 CONG. REc. S14,048 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1985) (statement of Sen. Wilson).
Senator Hatch stated: "I do, however, wish to express my continuing concern
that coverage of State and local government employees in the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act is beyond the limits of necessary Federal intervention in the affairs
of states and localities under the 10th amendment." 131 CONG. REc. S14,051
(daily ed. Oct. 24, 1985) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
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gation not required by state law. Such a reading would at least
condition the state's use of compensatory time on reaching a
compensatory time agreement with the representative. 0 7 Be-
cause the parties must agree, the employees' representative
could hold out for other concessions as a condition of
agreement.
The record shows that some have viewed the 1985 amend-
ments as creating an opportunity for employees to gain in-
creased bargaining power. Several commentators expressed
concern that the designated representative requirement of the
Labor Department regulations would allow employees to create
bargaining relationships not allowed under state law. 08 For
example, the National Education Association objected to regu-
lations allowing compensatory time to be made a condition of
employment for unrepresented employees; it claimed the act
was intended to give employees more bargaining power by
designating a compensatory time representative.109 Moreover,
some of the cases can be explained only by inferring that the
employees designated a representative solely to create a new
bargaining relationship for other purposes."10
Given the background of the 1985 amendments to the
FLSA, they should not be read to create a bargaining obligation
not required under state law. Instead, courts should require a
section 207(o)(2)(A)(i) agreement with the employees represen-
107. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(o)(2)(A)(i) (1988).
108. See 52 Fed. Reg. 2014 (1987) (comments submitted to Department of
Labor regarding proposed regulations).
109. See id, at 2015.
110. See Abbott v. City of Virginia Beach, 879 F.2d 132, 136 (4th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 854 (1990) (employees individually had absolute choice
as to whether to take compensatory time or money for overtime); Bleakly v.
City of Aurora, 679 F. Supp. 1008, 1010 (D. Colo. 1988) (employees could re-
ceive compensatory time or overtime pay at their discretion). In Abbott, Vir-
ginia law prohibited collective bargaining. 879 F.2d at 134. Thus, there was no
preexisting bargaining relationship. In Bleakly, the court noted that a collec-
tive organization represented the employees, 679 F. Supp. at 1010, but the
court did not state what kind of bargaining relationship, if any, existed.
In Dillard v. Harris, the state planned to grant compensatory time unless
there was enough money budgeted to cover overtime pay. 695 F. Supp. 565,
566 (N.D. Ga. 1987), aff'd, 885 F.2d 1549 (11th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 111 S. Ct.
210 (1990). Even if the employees were not trying to create the bargaining re-
lationship, they were trying to set up a barrier to the state's use of compensa-
tory time by appointing a representative with whom the state must negotiate.
The F-SA does not support such a barrier. See H.R. REP. No. 331, supra note




tative only when state law would require such an agreement,' U
or when the public employer has a past practice of bargaining
with the representative and the state has acquiesced in that
bargaining. 12 The purpose of this interpretation is to reach the
result most consistent with the present state system of public
sector labor relations. This Note thus disagrees with courts
that have construed section 207(o)(2)(A)(i) to require public
sector employers to agree with any representative designated
by its employees." 3 It attempts also to provide a definition for
the "recognized representative" requirement."14
A. PouCY CONSIDERATIONS FAVOR DETERMINING WHETHER
SECTION 207(o)(2)(A)(i) APPLIES WITH REFERENCE TO
STATE LAW
Several strong policy considerations favor interpreting the
agreement requirement with reference to state law. First, the
circumstances behind the passage of the amendments suggest
that Congress intended to decrease state burdens, not increase
them for choosing the compensatory time option." 5 Second,
problems peculiar to public sector labor relations suggest that
congressional action should not be read to change such rela-
tions unless Congress has clearly considered the ramifica-
tions.116  Finally, principles of federalism suggest that
congressional action should not be read to affect important
111. State law would probably not require parties to agree on the terms,
because NLRA-style systems would not require either party to make a conces-
sion as long as they bargained in good faith with present intent to reach an
agreement. See Befort, supra note 57, at 1224. In these states, however, the
applicable bargaining law would prohibit the state from unilaterally imposing
compensatory time on its represented employees. Therefore, state law would
in effect require the state to agree over compensatory time in order to grant it
pursuant to § 207(o)(2)(A)(i). Id.
112. Several states have upheld the validity of collectively bargained agree-
ments between public sector employers and their employees in the absence of
state statutes allowing such bargaining. See supra note 64 and accompanying
text.
113. See id
114. This proposal recognizes that the comments to the Labor Depart-
ment's implementing regulations state that the question of whether employees
have a § 207(o)(2)(A)(i) representative should be decided with reference to
state law. The regulations, however, provide conflicting signals. See infra
notes 166-71 and accompanying text. This proposal tries to sort out these sig-
nals and provide a more balanced approach.
115. See supra notes 24-37 and accompanying text (discussing the circum-
stances influencing the passage of the 1985 FLSA amendments).
116. See infra notes 122-32 and accompanying text.
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state interests absent clear congressional intent. 1 7
1. The Policies Behind the Compensatory Time Acts
Congress enacted the compensatory time amendments to
the FLSA to deal with what it perceived to be a serious fiscal
crisis for the states." 8 Congress intended the amendments to
relieve states of the burden of full compliance with the
FLSA." 9
The legislative history contains repeated references that
belie the idea that Congress intended to condition states' use of
the compensatory time option on making an agreement with an
entity with which it had no previous bargaining obligation
under state law. Committee reports note that states need the
freedom to structure their work forces and personnel relations
to meet their existing needs.120 Similarly, the legislative his-
tory expresses the desire that agreements over compensatory
time be reached "whenever possible."' 2 ' Such language shows
no intent to limit states' ability to use compensatory time by re-
quiring a new bargaining obligation.
2. Peculiar Problems of State Labor Relations
Public sector labor relations involve several problems not
found in the private sector which suggest that state public sec-
tor labor law merits deference. First, public sector collective
bargaining often requires accommodation between the bargain-
ing system and other state statutes that are incompatible with
private sector bargaining practices.2 2 Some states have munici-
pal civil service laws that specify terms of employment, or re-
solve issues such as teacher tenure or pension contribution
rates.123 States with defined collective bargaining systems often
provide specific solutions concerning what happens when bar-
117. See infra notes 133-50 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text. Some estimates of the
total cost of applying FLSA to the states ranged as high as $3 billion. See 51
Fed. Reg. 13,402, 13,405 (1986).
119. See suprm note 31.
120. The House Report stated that "it is essential that the particular needs
of the states and their political subdivisions be carefully weighed and fully ac-
commodated." H.R. REP. No. 331, supra note 12, at 17. The Senate Report
stated essentially the same proposition. See S. REP. No. 159, supra note 20, at
7, 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADwIN. NEws at 658.
121. See H.R. REP. No. 331, supra note 12, at 20.
122. Befort, supra note 57, at 1235.
123. Id at 1252.
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gaining terms conflict with such statutes.'2- Second, in many
cases, the entity negotiating on behalf of the state does not have
final decisionmaking power.'2 Instead, the legislature or other
elected body must approve any agreement.126 Thus it is some-
times difficult to determine which entity is the public em-
ployer.127 Third, the NLRA and many state statutes provide
that the union selected pursuant to its procedures is the em-
ployees' exclusive representative.1s These statutes also regu-
late the bargaining unit to ensure that employees in the same
bargaining unit have similar interests.'2 Allowing bargaining
by any representative designated by the employees could result
in similarly situated employees designating different represent-
atives with competing goals.I30 Ignoring state law regarding
representatives could also subject employees in the same classi-
fication to a compensatory time agreement made with the rep-
resentative, while others in the same classification might be
regulated by individual compensatory time agreements.131
These special problems peculiar to public sector labor rela-
tions suggest that courts should not apply the agreement re-
quirement in a manner that would change state labor law
obligations. Reading the compensatory time provisions to re-
quire agreement where state law would not, where employees
have merely designated a representative, forces the state to ac-
cept that bargaining relationship or not to use compensatory
time. 32 Given the problems inherent in public sector labor re-
124. Id- at 1233.
125. IM at 1232-35.
126. Id- at 1235.
127. I&
128. See National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988).
With respect to states, see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 14.20.560 (1990) (teachers); id
§ 23.40.100 (public employees); HAW. REV. STAT. § 89-8(a) (1985) (teachers).
129. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988).
130. Kearney suggested that southern states that prohibit collective bar-
gaining, but in which some bargaining activity does occur, should seriously
consider adopting public sector bargaining legislation because of the problems
caused by fragmented bargaining units and competition between bargaining
units when there is no provision for exclusive representation. R. KEARNEY,
supra note 51, at 61-62.
131. The Ninth Circuit did bring about this result in Nevada Employees
Ass'n v. Bryan, 916 F.2d 1384, 1388-89 (9th Cir. 1990). The court required the
state of Nevada to agree with all of its employees who had registered with the
employee association, but allowed individual contracts with the employees
who had not joined. Id If the employees covered by the representative hold
out for, and receive concessions, the question arises whether only those em-
ployees receive those benefits, or whether all do.
132. Two district court decisions required this result. See Jacksonville Pro-
fessional Fire Fighters Ass'n v. Jacksonville, 685 F. Supp. 513, 523 (E.D.N.C.
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lations, courts should not require this result unless Congress
clearly commanded it.
3. Principles of Federalism
After Garcia, the tenth amendment does not provide an in-
dependent check on congressional action.13 Courts have held,
however, that legislation should not be read to intrude on im-
portant state interests unless Congress clearly so states. In
United States v. Bass,'3 for example, the Supreme Court held
that a federal firearms statute must be read to require that the
accused possessed the firearm "in commerce" when the statute
was ambiguous as to the commerce requirement.135 The Court
reasoned that legislation affecting the federal-state balance
should be construed narrowly, to require that Congress actually
considered its action and the possible effects of such action.L3 6
1987) (holding that as long as employees designated a representative, the city
had to agree with them in order to grant compensatory time, even though
North Carolina law prohibited collective bargaining); Dillard v. Harris, 695 F.
Supp. 565, 568 (E.D.N.C. 1988) (stating that the court in Jacksonville reached
the correct result in holding a designated representative triggered
§ 207(o)(2)(A)(i), even though Georgia law prohibited collective bargaining),
rev'd, 885 F.2d 1549 (11th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 210 (1990).
133. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text (discussing Garcia).
134. 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
135. Id. at 337. The statute in Bass read, in pertinent part:
Any person who-
"(1) has been convicted by a court of the United States or of a State or
any political subdivision thereof of a felony.., and who receives, pos-
sesses or transports in commerce or affecting commere ... any fire-
arm shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more
than two years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1202(a) (1988), quoted in Bass, 404 U.S. at 337. The defendant was
convicted, and shown to have possessed a gun, but the government did not
show that his possession was "in commerce or affecting commerce." Bass, 404
U.S. at 338. The Court held that because the statute intruded on state criminal
law, and because it was unclear whether or not commerce was meant to mod-
ify "possessed," it would read the statute narrowly and require the govern-
ment to prove that the possession had been in commerce. Id. at 347.
136. Bass, 404 U.S. at 349. The Court stated that "[i]n traditionally sensi-
tive areas, such as legislation affecting the federal balance, the requirement of
clear statement assures that the legislature has in fact faced, and intended to
bring into issue, the critical matters involved in the judicial decision." Id.
Professor Tribe has argued that a canon against preemption survives Gar-
cia. He contends that by declining preemption where a congressional statute
is ambiguous, courts further the spirit of Garcia. Tribe concludes that given
the Court's reliance in Garcia on the political process to protect the states, see
supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text, finding preemption on ambiguous
language "would evade the very procedure for lawmaking on which Garcia re-
lied to protect state interests." L. TRIBE, AMERIcAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 6-
26, at 480 (2d ed. 1988).
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Two recent appellate court decisions have applied this ca-
non in cases involving the application of the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act'3 7 to appointed state judges.1as In
Gregory v. Ashcroft' 3 9 and EEOC v. Massachusetts,140 the
Eighth and First Circuits held that appointed state judges fell
within an ADEA exception for state governmental "ap-
pointee[s] on the policymaking level."'141 Both courts held that
the tenure of state judges is an important attribute of state sov-
ereignty, 14 2 and that unless the ADEA clearly applies to state
judges, they would not read it to so apply.143
Courts should apply this canon to determine that section
207(o)(2)(A)(i) does not change existing state labor relations
law. In Gregory, the Eighth Circuit applied this canon because
the tenure of state judges was important to the states' 44 and
has traditionally been regulated by the states. Likewise, regu-
lation of its employees, and the process by which states make
employment decisions, is a matter of considerable importance
to the states. 45 State public labor relations laws affect how the
states spend taxpayer dollars and how they provide essential
137. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, §§ 2, 11(f), 29 U.S.C.
§ 630(f) (1988).
138. The ADEA prohibits an employer from discriminating on the basis of
age on most employment decisions involving an employee who is more than 40
years old. Id. §§ 623, 631. The ADEA presently has no upper age limit. IE
§ 631(a).
139. 898 F.2d 598 (8th Cir. 1990). The United States Supreme Court af-
firmed the Eighth Circuit in Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395 (1991).
140. 858 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1988).
141. See Gregory, 898 F.2d at 599; EEOC, 858 F.2d at 54.
142. Gregory, 898 F.2d at 599; EEOC, 858 F.2d at 58.
143. In EEOC, the court stated: "If congress did not specifically consider
applying the ADEA to judges, and the exception by its terms and its goals, ap-
pears to apply to judges, we will so construe it." 858 F.2d at 55. Similarly, in
Gregory, the court held that:
because, however, the tenure of state judges is a matter of considera-
ble importance to the state, and one that traditionally has been left to
each state to regulate, we will examine the ADEA to determine
whether Congress explicitly and unequivocally manifested its intent
to preempt state law in this area.
898 F.2d at 600. The Supreme Court agreed, stating that "[w]e will not read
the ADEA to cover state judges unless Congress has made it clear that judges
are included." 111 S. Ct. at 2404 (emphasis in original).
144. See Gregory, 898 F.2d at 599.
145. Even though Garcia removed the tenth amendment as an independent
barrier to congressional action regarding the states, see supra notes 24-28 and
accompanying text, it does not necessarily refute the contention that the
FLSA is a significant intrusion on states' ability to structure its employment
relations and to provide essential services. Garcia merely changes the way
that the Court examines such issues.
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government services.146 Many states have held that in the ab-
sence of a statute, a state government may not delegate through
collective bargaining its responsibility to regulate its employ-
ees.147 Furthermore, with the exception of the FLSA, states
traditionally have regulated relations with their employees free
from federal interference. Congress excluded states and their
political subdivisions from the coverage of the NLRA.148 More-
over, Congress has not passed legislation regulating state public
sector bargaining, even though it has done so for federal
employees.149
Requiring state and local governments to make an agree-
ment with any "designated" employees' representative in order
to use compensatory time, even when state labor relations law
would not allow it, is a greater intrusion on the states than the
mere application of FLSA. The FLSA overtime provisions
merely dictate a term of employment. 5 0 The agreement re-
quirement in the 1985 FLSA amendments, however, requires
state and local governments to conform to a specific process in
making decisions about managing their employees. Given that
the overriding purpose of the 1985 amendments was to relieve
the burdens of FLSA compliance for state and local govern-
ments, it would be anomalous to read them to impose another
process not contemplated under state law.
B. CONGRESS DID NOT INTEND TO DISPLACE STATE LABOR
RELATIONS LAW
Given the policy reasons against reading the 1985 FLSA
amendments to change state labor relations law, courts should
not so read the amendments absent clear congressional intent
to that effect. An examination of the text, legislative history,
and purposes behind the statute shows that Congress did not
146. See H.R. REP. No. 331, supra note 12, at 18.
147. See, e.g., Perez v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 78 Cal. App. 2d 638, 650-51,
178 P.2d 537, 545 (1947); Mugford v. Mayor of Baltimore, 185 Md. 261, 270, 44
A.2d 745, 747 (1945); City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 1251, 44
S.W.2d 539, 545 (1947); Railway Mail Ass'n v. Murphy, 180 Misc. 868, 876, 44
N.Y.S.2d 601, 608 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1943), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Rail-
way Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 270 A.D. 470, 47 N.Y.S.2d 404, qff'd, 293 N.Y. 315, 56
N.E.2d 721 (1944), aff'd, 326 U.S. 88 (1945); Hagerman v. Dayton, 147 Ohio St.
313, 71 N.E.2d 246, 254 (1947).
148. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
149. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
150. See Alley, Duvall & Kornreich, Local Governments and the Fair La-
bor Standards Act: The Impact of Garcia v. SAMTA and the 1985 FLSA
Amendments, 15 STETSON L. REV. 715, 787-89 (1986); see also 29 U.S.C.
§ 207(a)(1) (1988) (FLSA overtime provisions; text quoted supra note 12).
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clearly intend to change state law bargaining obligations when
it enacted the agreement requirement.
1. The Plain Language of the Statute
The plain language of section 207(o)(2)(A)(i) does not cre-
ate a new collective bargaining obligation between state and lo-
cal governments and their employees. Read together, sections
207(o)(2)(A)(i) and 207(o)(2)(A)(ii) merely require that state
and local governments agree with their employees to grant
compensatory time before employees log overtime hours.151
Section 207(o)(2)(A)(i) says nothing about changing the ex-
isting collective bargaining rights of public employees with re-
spect to when employees have a representative. For example,
the Eleventh Circuit in Dillard, in construing the statute to re-
quire a recognized representative, noted that the statutory lan-
guage did not provide that any representative the employees
chose would constitute a representative for purposes of section
207(o)(2)(A)(i). 152 Had Congress intended such a requirement,
it could have clearly stated so.153 The lack of any reference in
the text of the 1985 amendments to the creation of new collec-
tive bargaining rights for state employees suggests that Con-
gress did not intend to change existing collective bargaining
obligations created by state law.
Moreover, Congress did not believe that employees must be
represented in order for states to use the compensatory time
option.'5 Congress allowed states to make compensatory time
agreements with individual employees. This provision strongly
suggests that Congress did not consider the employees' ability
151. The statute does require an agreement; however, the method of agree-
ment is stated in the alternative. Subclause (i) requires that the agreement be
with the employees' representative, 29 U.S.C. § 207(o)(2)(A)(i) (1988), while
subclause (ii) allows such agreements to be made with individual employees,
id. § 207(o)(2)(A)(ii). Neither subclause, however, defines what constitutes a
representative. Id. Thus the plain language does not create a new bargaining
obligation.
152. Dillard v. Harris, 885 F.2d at 1549, 1556 (11th Cir. 1989) ("In any event,
if the mere designation of a representative with whom the agency could not
merely make an agreement should be sufficient to control the method of com-
pensation, it would have been simple for the statute to plainly so provide."),
cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 210 (1990).
153. Id.
154. The fact that Congress allowed compensatory time agreements with
individual employees shows that they did not see bargaining as a requirement.
In fact, the House committee report states that compensatory time may be
made a condition of employment for individual, unrepresented employees.
H.R. REP. No. 331, supra note 12, at 20.
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to meaningfully bargain over the issue to be of controlling im-
portance, 5 5 because individual employees have little power to
bargain over their terms and condition of employment. 5 6
Thus, requiring agreement with a representative over compen-
satory time must have been motivated by something other than
a congressional desire to create a meaningful bargaining oppor-
tunity for public sector employees.
What seems more likely, given the circumstances sur-
rounding the passage of the amendments, is that the require-
ment of an agreement with the employees' representative
demonstrates Congress's intent to give employees some ability
to choose whether or not to accept compensatory time, and yet
to allow as many jurisdictions as possible to use the compensa-
tory time option. Congress showed an intent not to upset ex-
isting collective bargaining agreements regarding compensatory
time.' 57 Congress also realized that under some state labor re-
lations laws the employer will only be able to make such an
agreement with the employees' representative.,8 Congress's
stated goals of giving employees some choice regarding compen-
satory time'5 9 and allowing as many jurisdictions as possible to
take advantage of the compensatory time option, 6 0 belie the
conclusion that Congress passed the 1985 amendments with the
intention that no new bargaining relationship be created.
155. Congress included the agreement requirements to give employees
some element of choice concerning compensatory time. See id- at 19.
156. Congress passed the NLRA in part to ameliorate the lack of bargain-
ing strength of unorganized labor. Section One of the act states, inter alia:
"The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess
full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are
organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association substan-
tially burdens commerce." National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act of 1935,
§ 1, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449, 449 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169
(1988)).
157. See H.R. REP. No. 331, supra note 12, at 18.
158. In states with NLRA-style policies involving exclusive representation
and mandatory bargaining, states will have to make an agreement with the
representative. See Befort, supra note 57, at 1230. A letter from the Congres-
sional Budget Office suggests that the purpose of agreement with representa-
tive requirement is to permit collective bargaining jurisdictions to preserve
existing agreements regarding compensatory time. See Letter from Rudolph
G. Penner to Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources (Oct. 15,
1985), reprinted in S. REP. No. 159, supra note 21, at 16, 1985 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADmiN. NEws at 664.
159. See Abbott v. City of Virginia Beach, 879 F.2d 132, 137 (4th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct 854 (1990).




The legislative history of and administrative regulations
promulgated under the 1985 FLSA amendments do not clearly
demonstrate congressional intent to change existing state labor
relations law bargaining obligations. The House Report appears
to require an agreement with a representative if the employees
simply have designated that representative.16 1 Such a reading
would create a new collective bargaining obligation. The Sen-
ate Report, however, does not support this interpretation. It
states that individual agreements are permitted unless the em-
ployees have a recognized representative. 162 The Senate com-
mittee's reference to a "recognized" representative suggests
that the public employer is the body that must recognize the
representative, and that state law governs such recognition.' 6s
Thus, read together, the committee reports do not create a new
collective bargaining obligation.
The Senate Report should be considered as more authorita-
tive than the House Report. Congress ultimately passed the
Senate version of the amendments.164 Where legislative histo-
ries conflict, courts find the history from the house where the
bill originated more authoritative.'65 Thus, the Senate inter-
pretation should control, and courts should not find a congres-
sional intent to change state public sector labor relations law.
The Department of Labor regulations similarly do not sup-
port a congressional intent to change existing public sector la-
161. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
163. At least one court has looked to other statutes to define recognition.
"Recognition", as that term is understood in the context of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, the Taft-Hartley amendments, and labor
law in general, means the acknowledgement by an employer that a
collective-bargaining representative has been designated by a majority
of employees in the appropriate bargaining unit and thus that the em-
ployer is obligated to bargain exclusively with the representative.
Abbott v. City of Virginia Beach, 689 F. Supp. 600, 602 (E.D. Va. 1988) (citing
NLRB v. Ralph Printing & Lithographing Co., 379 F.2d 687, 692-93 (8th Cir.
1967); NLRB v. Clinton E. Hobbs Co., 132 F.2d 249, 251 (1st Cir. 1942)), qff'd,
879 F.2d 132 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 854 (1990). Because there is no fed-
eral statute concerning state and local government labor relations, recognition
would have to occur under state law. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying
text (discussing lack of federal statute for public sector bargaining outside of
federal government employees).
164. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 357, supra note 42, at 7, 1985 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 668. The House substituted the Senate bill as an
amendment to its version. Id.
165. See, e.g., Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 254 (1956), quoted in Dillard
v. Harris, 885 F.2d 1549, 1554 (11th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 210 (1990).
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bor law bargaining obligations. The regulations require
agreement with the employee's representative whenever the
employees have a "recognized or otherwise designated represen-
tative."'6 At the same time, comments to the regulations state
that whether the employees have a representative is a question
of state law.1 6 7 If "designated" means merely to choose a repre-
sentative, the regulations are internally inconsistent. 168
Comments to the regulations also reject the contention
that Congress intended to change state labor relations law.
During the comment period, the National Education Associa-
tion (NEA) opposed regulations allowing public sector employ-
ers to make compensatory time a condition of employment for
unrepresented employees. 169 The NEA argued that such a pro-
vision conflicted with Congress's intent to allow employees to
increase their bargaining power by designating representatives
for compensatory time agreements. 70 The Labor Department
disagreed, stating that Congress clearly allowed compensatory
time as a condition of employment,171 suggesting that the mere
designation of a representative by the employees is insufficient
to trigger the representative requirement of section
207(o)(2)(A)(i).
IV. A NEW ANALYSIS: LOOKING AT THE EXISTING
BARGAINING RELATIONSHIP
An examination of the text and legislative history of the
1985 amendments, as well as underlying labor law policy, com-
pels the conclusion that the "representative" prong of the 1985
amendments does not change existing collective bargaining re-
lationships between public sector employers and their employ-
ees. The courts that have found that the amendments require a
recognized, not merely a designated, representative, correctly
interpret the amendments. Given the variety of existing state
labor law, and the unclear Labor Department regulations,172
the requirement needs further definition. Courts should apply
166. See 29 C.F.R. § 553.23(b)(1) (1990) (quoted supra note 47).
167. See 52 Fed. Reg. 2014-15 (1987) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 553)
(quoted supra note 50).
168. Such inconsistency shows the lack of clear congressional intent to cre-
ate a new bargaining obligation. The terms "recognized" and "designated," as
they seem to be used here, are mutually exclusive.
169. See 52 Fed. Reg. 2017 (1987).
170. Id.
171. Id




the "agreement with representative" requirement when ex-
isting state labor relations law provides an obligation to bargain
with the representative or the parties have a prior state ap-
proved practice of bargaining over similar issues. In this man-
ner, the 1985 amendments will disrupt state public labor
relations as little as possible.
Such a reading of the amendments recognizes the variety
of state labor law. It would not allow employees to use the
amendments to force themselves into a bargaining relationship
that the state does not require and the employer does not
want.173 The reading, however, recognizes also that in certain
situations, public sector employers, in the absence of statutory
authority, have entered into collective negotiations with em-
ployees in which states have acquiesced.' 7 4 Above all, this pro-
posal recognizes that Congress was trying to relieve the
burdens caused by the Garcia decision, and that Congress
neither intended to allow employers to get around existing bar-
gaining obligations nor to create new ones.175
A. STATES FOLLOWING NLRA-STYLE LABOR RELATIONS
POLICIES
In states that have enacted NLRA-style bargaining policies,
application of the "non-interference" test is simple. If the em-
ployees have organized themselves as the state statute provides,
the state must make an agreement with the representative
before granting compensatory time.'7 6 In states with such poli-
173. The cases show that public sector employers are faced with a choice if
the designated representative requirement is accepted: either agree with the
representative or forego the compensatory time option. See Nevada Employ-
ees Ass'n v. Bryan, 916 F.2d 1384, 1390 (9th Cir. 1990); Local 2203 v. West Ad-
ams Fire Protection Dist., 877 F.2d 814, 816-20 (10th Cir. 1989). Some states
might not uphold or allow the agreement.
174. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 27-32 (discussing the circumstances and purposes be-
hind the amendments). The intent of Congress to relieve states of some of the
burdens of FLSA compliance makes it unlikely that they conditioned use of
the compensatory time option on state acceptance of an additional burden not
imposed under state law.
176. A straightforward application of the text of the statute leads to this
conclusion. After the 1985 amendments, the FLSA requires an agreement
with the employees before compensatory time can be offered. 29 U.S.C.
§ 207(o)(2)(A) (1988). This agreement can be reached with the employees' rep-
resentative under § 207(o)(2)(A)(i). Id. If the employees do not have a recog-
nized collective bargaining representative under the applicable state statute,
then the state can agree with individual employees, pursuant to
§ 207(o)(a)(2)(ii). Id. If the employees have selected a representative under
the state labor relations law, the state will, under its own law, be prohibited
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cies, overtime compensation -will almost certainly be a
mandatory subject of bargaining.1 77 Thus, under state law, the
public employer would be required to bargain with the repre-
sentative over compensatory time and could not unilaterally
impose compensatory time policies. Also, the exclusive repre-
sentation principle would prevent the state or local government
from making individual contracts with employees on issues sub-
ject to mandatory bargaining. 78 Following the non-interfer-
ence principle, requiring agreement with the representative
over compensatory time would have the least disruptive effect
on the existing bargaining relationship. 7 9
B. STATES THAT PROHIBIT COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
States that have no formal public sector labor relations pol-
icy and that prohibit, or refuse to enforce, collective bargaining
agreements, also present a simple case under the "non-interfer-
ence" principle. In these states, there is no bargaining relation-
ship. The state has determined that collective bargaining is not
in the public interest. 8 0 Requiring agreement with a represen-
tative "designated" by the employees in this situation contra-
venes that policy and would further no clearly articulated
federal policy. 181 Such a requirement would also potentially
from unilaterally imposing compensatory time. See Befort, supra note 57, at
1232-35. Also, because of the exclusive representation principle in NLRA-style
states, the employer will not be able to reach individual contracts on issues
that are subjects of mandatory bargaining. HcL at 1235. Therefore the interplay
of state law and the 1985 amendments requires an agreement with the employ-
ees' representative.
177. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
178. The NLRA has been interpreted to invalidate contracts with individ-
ual employees on issues subject to mandatory bargaining when employees
have a collective bargaining representative. See J.I. Case, Co. v. NLRB, 321
U.S. 332, 337 (1944) ("individual contracts, no matter what the circumstances
that justify their execution or what their terms, may not be availed of to de-
feat or delay the procedures prescribed by the National Labor Relations Act
looking to collective bargaining"). State labor relations laws based on the
NLRA have been similarly interpreted. See Befort, supra note 57, at 1233.
179. To say that the parties would not have to reach agreement when state
law requires it would require a finding that Congress intended to preempt
state law to allow such unilateral action by the states. The fact that Congress
included a section of the FLSA allowing agreements to be made with employ-
ees' representatives strongly suggests that it did not intend to preempt state
law in this regard. In fact, Congress intended the opposite. Therefore, requir-
ing agreement with the representative in NLRA-style bargaining states re-
quires merely that one follow state law.
180. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
181. The 1985 amendments contain no clearly articulated policy to change,
or preempt, existing state labor relations law. See supra notes 131-51. Requir-
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subject the public sector employer to the problems of bargain-
ing with a non-exclusive representative1 8 2 The principle that
the 1985 amendments did not intend to change the bargaining
obligations of the parties leads to the conclusion that, where
states do not have a labor relations policy and prohibit collec-
tive agreements, public sector employers may grant compensa-
tory time pursuant to agreements with individual employees.
18 3
Under this analysis, the appellate courts in Abbott'8 and
DillardL8 5 correctly concluded that the public sector employers
could grant compensatory time pursuant to agreements with in-
dividual employees. In both cases, the state prohibited public
sector collective bargaining. 86 Requiring an agreement in situ-
ations such as these would contravene state policy without a
clear statement of federal policy to do so. L8 7
C. STATES THAT ALLOW BARGAINING WITHOUT A COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING STATUTE
Some states have no articulated labor relations policy, yet
allow bargaining to occur, and state courts have been willing to
uphold such agreements. 8 8 In these states, public sector em-
ployers should have to make an agreement with employee rep-
resentatives concerning compensatory time only if they have a
preexisting bargaining relationship concerning wages and hours
issues that state courts have upheld.'8 9 Construing the statu-
tory requirements in this manner has two advantages. First,
ing an agreement with a designated representative would, in some states, con-
travene state policy. See supra note 67.
182. The Ninth Circuit did bring about this result in Nevada Employees
Ass'n v. Bryan, 916 F.2d 1384 (9th Cir. 1990). The court required the state of
Nevada to agree with all of its employees who had registered with the em-
ployee association, but allowed individual contracts with the employees who
had not joined. Id. at 1388-89. If the employees covered by the representative
hold out for, and receive concessions, the question arises whether only those
employees receive those benefits, or whether all do.
183. Under the analysis above, courts should not find preemption in impor-
tant areas of state regulation unless Congress clearly intends it. Where Con-
gress has not clearly so stated, state policy must stand. See supra notes 131-50
and accompanying text.
184. Abbott v. City of Virginia Beach, 879 F.2d 132 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. de-
nied, 110 S. Ct. 854 (1990).
185. Dillard v. Harris, 885 F.2d 1549 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
210 (1990).
186. See supra notes 82-91, 93-97 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 151-71 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (discussing such states).
189. This approach changes existing state labor relations law the least. The
state, by not mandating bargaining, but yet allowing it, has allowed individual
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this construction recognizes that public sector employers may
see the value of collective negotiation even if the state does not
require it. Second, this construction does not allow public sec-
tor employers to use the 1985 amendments as an excuse to
avoid bargaining over compensatory time when they have done
so concerning similar issues in the past.1 90 Under this ap-
proach, however, an employee organization could not force the
public sector employer to bargain for the first time over com-
pensatory time issues.191 Again, existing bargaining obligations
under state law would remain unchanged.
Under the approach of this Note, courts would need more
information to decide whether an agreement with the employ-
ees' representative would be required in cases like Nevada Em-
ployees Association v. Bryan' 92 and Nevada Highway Patrol
Association v. Nevada.193 In both cases, the Ninth Circuit for-
malistically adhered to the "recognized" representative require-
ment. 94  The court required an agreement with the
representative in Bryan because it had been officially "recog-
nized" by the state legislature. 195 In Nevada Highway Patrol,
the court did not require an agreement because the representa-
tive had not been "recognized."'1 96 To apply the test suggested
by this Note, the court would need to know whether the state
had bargained in the past over these issues with the representa-
tive.197 Similarly, in Local 2203 v. West Adams International
employers to make the choice. Thus, state policy is followed most closely by
requiring agreements only where there is a past practice of doing so.
190. Statements in the legislative history of the 1985 amendments suggest
that Congress recognized the value of collectively negotiated agreements,
where states allowed them, and did not want to interfere with that process.
See H.R. REP. No. 331, supra note 12, at 19.
191. This approach ensures that the public employer has considered the
pros and cons of collective negotiation and decided negotiation was in its best
interest.
192. 916 F.2d 1384 (9th Cir. 1990).
193. 899 F.2d 1549 (9th Cir. 1989).
194. In Bryan, the court found that the employees had a recognized repre-
sentative because the state legislature had passed a resolution proclaiming the
association as the employees' representative. 916 F.2d at 1390. The association
at issue in Nevada Highway Patrol had not been similarly recognized. Id.
195. Id at 1390.
196. Nevada Highway Patrol, 899 F.2d at 1554-55.
197. See supra notes 96-102 and accompanying text. One might argue that
the court in this case did determine the method that would least impair ex-
isting state law. It seems, however, that the court thought that the statute re-
quired merely a formalistic recognition of a representative in its examination
of state law. Such an analysis can lead to a result that deviates from existing
practice, a result not compelled by the statute. Courts also should not merely
look for the word "recognized" concerning a specific representative. Instead,
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Association of Firefighters,198 the court would need to know if
bargaining had occurred in the past and if the employer had ac-
quiesced.199 If so, the 1985 amendments would require agree-
ment with the representative. If not, the statute would not
require such an agreement.
CONCLUSION
When Congress enacted the compensatory time amend-
ments to the FLSA in 1985, it intended to relieve states of some
of the burdens of complying with the overtime provisions of the
FLSA. Congress did not intend to create a new obligation for
states to agree with any representative that the employees des-
ignate. This Note suggests that courts should require such
agreements with employee representatives only where doing so
would not change existing bargaining obligations under state
law or existing state practice. Such a reading conforms with
congressional intent to provide states with options in employee
relations. In addition, it does not hinder the development of
collective negotiations by willing public sector employers even
where not required by law.
Todd D. Steenson
they should specifically examine the prior practice of the parties to determine
whether or not requiring agreement with a representative would be most con-
sistent with existing state practice.
198. 877 F.2d 814 (10th Cir. 1989).
199. Although Colorado, which does not have a comprehensive bargaining
policy, see supra note 64, has upheld such agreements, it has also upheld the
right of municipalities to bar collective bargaining in their city charter. See
Fellows v. LaTronica, 151 Colo. 300, 394-06, 377 P.2d 547, 550-51 (1962) (en
banc).
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